How the United
States Created Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Pozner
September 27, 2018,
Yale University
The Program in Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies
and the Poynter Fellowship for Journalism
The Program in Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies
and the Poynter Fellowship for Journalism
with:
Professor Constantine
Muravnik and Professor Douglas Rogers
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8X7Ng75e5gQ
Douglas
Rogers:
- Good afternoon, everybody and welcome to today's events.
My name is Douglas Rogers, I teach
in the Anthropology Department, and I'm
the Faculty Director of the
program in Russian East European and
Eurasian studies. Today is a special
event not just because of our guest,
who's one of the most well known, most distinguished and most fascinating journalists and
broadcasters in the past 50 years,
anywhere in the world, but because in a
much smaller and more modest way, this
is the first time that words program in
Russian East European and Eurasian studies
are being uttered in public at Yale.
Applause is appropriate. (audience applauding)
Our program dates from July 1st, 2018. And
we think that the interest that we're
carrying around campus and full
auditoriums
like today are good evidence of
expanding interest in the study of this
part of the world. So thank you for
coming. Look at our website, get on our
newsletter, we hope to bring you many
more events like this. I want to thank
Macmillan Center, the council in
European studies, for helping us with
this event also, and especially the
pointer fellowship in journalism, and
the Office of Public Affairs and communication.
Eileen O'Connor is somewhere here.
Thank you very much for your partnership in this event and many other events we've had in the
past and hope to have in the
future. The plan for today is that I
will turn things over to Constantine
Muravnik, who I'm also very grateful to
for suggesting this program and for doing a lot of the work to make it happen. He'll
introduce our guest, who will then speak
for a little while, followed by sort of
open question answer and discussion period. So without further ado, Constantine. (audience applauding)
Constantine Muravnik:
- It is my distinct honor to welcome
Vladimir Pozner to Yale. Mr.
Pozner needs an introduction only for those
who are too young to remember the '80s and the '90s
in this country when he regularly
appeared on Ted Koppel's Nightline and
The Phil Donahue Show and then co hosted
the Pozner/Donahue show on CNBC. At that
time, he once visited Yale, so it's not
a welcome but a welcome back. Mr. Pozner
may also need an introduction to those
who are detached from contemporary Russia, where
he is omnipresent in the media. For the
past 10 years, he has hosted a weekly
show, Pozner, where he interviews
various national and world leaders from
all walks of life; Gorbachev, Sekulow,
Gaidar, Shoigu, Ted Turner and
Vekselberg, Hillary Clinton and Sting,
Michael McFaul and Ksenia Sobchak, among many others had a chance to face Mr. Pozner's thoughtful
scrutiny and be judged by millions of
Russian viewers. Mr. Pozner's opinions
on a wide range of questions from
politics to soccer, from history to astronomy,
and arts quickly go viral. They
have become a fact of Russian life to such an extent
that he has been termed, have seriously, half
ingest, the spiritual leader of the
nation and its moral compass. This is
despite the fact that Mr. Pozner is Russian
just as much as he is an American or French.
He was born in France and christened in Notre
Dame, grew up in the U.S. and came to
Russia only at the age of 19.
Perhaps this cosmopolitan aspect of his
biography is what endears him to Russian
public tire like any other public of
ideological agendas. Perhaps, this
ability to be simultaneously Russian and
American and European attunes Mr. Pozner
to the subtleties of different perspectives,
and brings him one step closer to the much
desired and no less appreciated
objectivity and truth. Especially now,
when the gaps separating governments and
nations are only widening. And one side
increasingly refuses to consider the
views of the other. In his more than
five decades in the field of journalism,
Mr. Pozner has done his share of
partisanship and propaganda. However,
this changed in the '80s when he
pioneered a project of so called space
bridges, or tele bridges that connect
with Russian and American audiences.
Moscow viewers named Kim TV journalist number one in 1989. And this high mark of recognition
has never decreased ever since. In
1989, and in from 1994 to 2008, Mr. Pozner
headed the Russian television
Academy. In 1997, he founded the School
for Television Excellence, a platform
for education and promotion of young journalists. He's
written several books and made a number of
documentary
miniseries about different countries,
their cultures and people. These films
brought the U.S., France, Italy,
Germany, England, Israel and Spain closer to
millions of Russian people. It is my hope
that this conversation with Mr.
Pozner at Yale will also achieve what he
has been so good at. That
it
will bring
Russian views and opinions a little
closer to our students and colleagues,
and will maintain what we all need now the most,
a dialogue, based on mutual understanding and
respect. So please join me in welcoming
Vladimir
Pozner. (audience applauding)
I'd like to say, first of all, that we are, at an extremely dangerous moment today. Never have the relations between Russia and the United States with the Soviet Union, not what it was before, been at this level.
During the worst times of the Cold War, when I was living in the Soviet Union, and I remember all that very, very well. Russians were anti White House, anti Wall Street, but not anti American, in their vast majority. In fact, there was a kind of a warm feeling these are the Americans. Today that's different. Today it's anti American at the grassroots level. And there's a reason for it. Another thing that is, to me scary is that neither side seems to be afraid of nuclear weapons.
30 years ago, those of you who are of my age certainly remember an American movie called "The Day After," which is about what happens to you and to your country after a nuclear strike. There was fear of these weapons as there was in the Soviet Union, there was a realization that these weapons can and if used will destroy our country. Today, there's a feeling when you talk to people, it's as if there are no nuclear weapons. It really doesn't seem to play a role in how we act. And the danger of a not a deliberate nuclear exchange, but an accidental one has grown because the level of mistrust between the two countries has grown as well. There have been several times in the past when computers warned of a nuclear attack. But it never got to the real thing because people took the time to really check it out. Now, they didn't have a long time. If an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) is launched from Russia, it will take about 10 minutes for it to hit the U.S. So you know, and vice versa obviously. So you don't have a long time but you do have some. But my feeling is that if today those same computers malfunction and it's on either side, that an attack has been launched, the response would be immediate. Because the feeling is that this is what's going to happen.
Not that long ago, we were all very optimistic, weren't we? Gorbachev, Gorby, Gorby, Russians, we're gonna be friends, we're gonna be... And in such a really short period of time, how did this happen? Why are we at the point that we are today? And I'm not saying who's to blame, because that's not a productive way of looking at things. But we should try to understand exactly what did happen. The Soviet Union once Gorbachev took over, didn't really last very long. He came to power in March of 1985. And by December 1991, there was no more Soviet Union. Some people say, it collapsed, didn't collapse. In a place called the Belavezha, which is a kind of a forest, three presidents, the President of Ukraine, the President of Belarus, and the President of Russia proper, Mr. Yeltsin decided to part company, decided to disband the Soviet Union. Now, each had his own reasons, definitely. But if we look at Mr. Yeltsin, his reasoning was very clear. He was the president of Russia. So he was number two to Gorbachev. Because Gorbachev was President of the Soviet Union, which Russia was part, the largest part, but only part. Get rid of the Soviet Union, and there's no President and you get rid of Gorbachev. That's precisely what he did. So no more Soviet Union. Quickly no more Warsaw Pact, of course, that is to say, countries that were usually called Soviet satellites, and part of a military alliance with the Soviet Union, that Alliance disappeared.
And so the United States had to figure out, how do we deal with this new entity called Russia? How do we deal with it? There's no more Soviet Union. What is going to be U.S. policy, vis-a-vis this country. And of course, Yeltsin also had to think about what is going to be Russia's attitude towards the United States. You may remember that soon after the Soviet Union cease to exist, and I think it was February of 1992, Yeltsin came to the United States. And he addressed the joint session of Congress. And he said, the people of Russia are offering their hand to the people of the United States in friendship, to build a better world, a world without war, a world with our peace. And this was exactly what the vast majority of Russians wanted. And I would even say that today, the vast majority of Russians would like to have, if not a friendship with the United States, at least a partnership. There's no doubt to my mind that that's the case. So that was what Yeltsin wanted, and what kind of response did he get? What kind of response did Russia get?
Well, the United States could have picked two ways of treating Russia. One was to say, let's treat Russia like we did our enemies after World War II, Germany, Italy, and in some of the countries that were occupied, such as France, or were not occupied such as UK but were really badly hurt. Let's find a way to see to it that in those countries, Nazis, fascists do not come back. And communists do not come to power, and may remind you that in those days, the Communist Party of France and the Communist Party of Italy were very, very powerful. And that plan turned out was called later the Marshall Plan, which was basically a financial ideas idea to spend a lot of money but in a very precise way to develop certain things, and not to allow others to develop.
Now, that could be the policy, to adopt vis-a-vis Russia. See to it that democracy begins to develop in that country. And let me say, just for the record, Russia never in its entire thousand years, never had democracy, completely absent. So it wasn't like something that once upon a time Russians had, and then they lost, but they knew what it was. They didn't know what it was. So let's spend money on getting democracy moving in Russia and seeing to it that the communists do not get back. And that could have been one approach. The other approach was to say, for 40 years, you held a nuclear bomb over our heads, you lost the Cold War, and you're gonna pay for it. You're gonna be punished for what you did. And there were people who supported one view and people who supported the other in this country.
Early in 1992 a document was produced in the United States by a gentleman called Paul Wolfowitz. You may know who he was, he was under Secretary of Defense of the United States responsible for policy. The document he produced came to be called the Wealth of its Doctrine, not officially, but that's the way it was addressed. It later was incorporated in something that was officially called the Bush Doctrine. That document was leaked to the New York Times. And so it became public. And what it basically said, and you can look it up, it's available, you know, just go to Wolfowitz Doctrine, and you'll find it, what it basically said was this. The United States should never again, allow any other country to challenge it. The United States must remain the superior country. And we should tell our allies not to worry about developing their own weapons because we will do that for them. And we must watch out for Russia because we don't know which way it's going to go. The bear might get up on his hind legs again, and growl.
When that document was leaked to the New York Times, there was an outcry by the more liberal, if you will, in America now the word liberal and conservative has lost the meaning that it once upon a time had. So when I say liberal, I'm not sure that I'm saying the right word, but at least many people were upset by this document. Edward Kennedy said that it was an imperialist document that no country could or should accept. It was quickly as it were removed and rewritten by Mr. Cheney. Not a very liberal man in any sense as far as I can remember. And the Secretary of Defense in those days, Mr. Powell, but basically it retained that view, Russia and America must remain, was to be the only superpower. And basically, that view was the one that was accepted. It was the one that was accepted. And the attitude towards Russia was pretty much, you're no longer a superpower. You are a second rate country. Just keep quiet, please. This became evident and would be evident to you if you follow the policy of the United States.
Now, let's begin with going back to Gorbachev and his meetings when he was asked by several people, all of them quite important, to allow Germany's to reunite and take down the Berlin Wall. And he was told by James Baker, and now this is not many people. I mean, when I would say this, many people say, it's not true, it's not true. He was told by James Baker[1], if this happens, NATO will not move one inch eastward. Well, not long ago, on December 12th, 2017, the National Defense archives of George Washington University, declassified the minutes of the Baker-Gorbachev discussion, and it's there.
But it's not only Baker who said that to him, there was several people there, the German leadership did, Western Germany those days and so on. And finally, I'm not saying, I don't know whether Gorbachev could have stopped Germany from uniting but the fact of the matter is that they said “yes” and took down the Berlin Wall. And NATO stayed put, it stayed put in those days. It stayed put under Bush Senior, it stayed put during the first four years of Clinton. But in the next four years in 1996, approximately, a decision was taken to enlarge NATO, three countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.
That decision, and now I'm giving you my opinion, is what really started this relation, turning itself, as you might say, that's where it all began. Because the Russian reaction and specifically this is 1998, so this is Yeltsin, late Yeltsin was, you promised not to do this. So, how do we trust you, if you make a promise? I would also like you to, perhaps try to solve a little problem. It's a kind of a mathematical. Take the time from when Gorbachev came to power, March 1985, to 2007, when Putin has been in power for seven years, that's 22 years. I ask you to find a single thing in foreign or domestic policies done by the Soviet Union while still existed, and then Russia proper that might in any way anger, irk, disappoint the United States? Let me answer that for you. Nothing, not one thing during that period. Now, what did Russia get as a result of that? First, the enlargement of NATO. So that was number one. Then the bombing of Yugoslavia. That was done by NATO and NATO is after all dependent mostly on the United States. Let's face it, right? The UN did not condone this. So the bombing of Yugoslavia that's from March 24th,'99, to June 10th, '99. Then Kosovo and recognition of Kosovo although it had been part of Serbia for centuries, and there were people in Russia who said, you're letting the genie out of the bottle. Because if you do this, then there are other countries that will do the same. And Russia did the same as the aphasia to begin with, okay. Yelstin was very angry. He made a speech, he said, and of course, this is very Yeltsin-like. He said, "We're not Haiti, you can't treat us like Haiti. We’re a great country. We have a great past and Russia will come back. Russia will come back." He was really, really angry. He didn't say the politically correct thing but he spoke his mind. Then finally 2000, year 2000, Mr. Putin is not elected, although elected to the presidency. And one of the first thing he does is to ask for Russia, to become a member of NATO. Why not be a member of NATO? NATO was created to defend Europe and perhaps not only Europe from Soviet aggression, from a country that you couldn't predict. There is no more Soviet Union, and there is no more Warsaw Pact. Why can't we create an organization where we are part of it, said Mr. Putin, and act together to protect from some kind of aggression. He was told, go take a walk, basically. What about some kind of partnership or becoming part of the European Union? Again, and this is all documented, everything I say, except when I say my opinion, is documented, you can look it up. And he (NATO) said “No”, you know, “You're too big”. Your country is too big, you can. And all the while Russia was being reminded that it's no longer really that important in the country.
But seriously speaking, that's a fact. And so the sense of losing this aura of greatness of being told, we don't care about you, the reaction of the average Russian to that was one of you're insulting me. You don't respect me. And so the anger, gradually, and the anger focused on Gorbachev. Many, many Russians figured you sold the country. You don't stand up to these men, to the United States. And then the same thing for Yeltsin.
So finally in 2007, in Munich speaking to the group of 20 in Munich, Putin says this. This is February 10th. "I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation "that reduces the level of mutual trust. "And we have the right to ask against whom "Is this expansion intended?" And what happened to the assurance of our Western partners "made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, "where are those declarations today?" "No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of General Secretary, Mr. Berner of Brussels on May 17th, 1990. He said at the time, quote, the fact that we are not ready "to place a NATO army outside of German territory, gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee. Where are these guarantees?" And you know what the answer was? The answer was, yes, but that was guarantees given to the Soviet Union and you're Russia. Well, what kind of a reaction would you expect? Last year, I think it was, making a foreign policy speech, Putin said, "Our mistake was that we trusted you too much. And your mistake was that you tried to take advantage of that."
So something I wanna underline, so we are in now in a new arms race, which is terrible. We are in a new Cold War which threatens all of us. The danger of an accidental nuclear exchange has grown. We no longer seem to fear that, there used to be demonstrations, you know, get rid of nuclear weapons, that's not happening anymore. The possibility of a terrorist organization somehow getting a nuclear weapon has grown. And to make it look like someone used it on each side, not the terrorists. So that I believe is something we should all understand and finally, as someone who works in media, I would like to say that Russian media, Mainstream, I mean Mainstream Media, paints America black Russian media, Mainstream media controlled directly or indirectly by the government shows an extremely negative picture of the United States, U.S. policy and so on. And much to my surprise, mainstream American media does exactly the same thing vis-a-vis Russia. Which to me, is amazing because this is supposed to be a free media that's differing from the Russian one.
So I'd like to wind up with a quote from a gentleman, no, I hesitate to use the word gentleman, from a man whose name was Herman Goering. You all know who he was? There may be some people who are too young to know. Well, he was Hitler's right hand man, and he commanded the Luftwaffe, the German Air Force. And he was, of course, at Nuremberg, he was judged, getting sentenced to death to hang. But he managed to get some poison, probably from the Soviets, of course, since they poison people, as we know, so as not to be hanged. But he was interviewed by an American journalist shortly before he committed suicide. And here's what he said. And I think this is something that we should all remember. "Naturally, the common people don't want war – neither in Russia nor in England, nor for that matter in Germany, that is understood. But after all, it is the leaders of the country who determined the policy. And it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is the democracy or a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the peacemakers for a lack of patriotism, and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country." – said Mr. Goering.
And I think he was absolutely right. And we are being led by our media, by our politicians in that direction in both countries. I remember an ad that I saw, a famous American actor whose name I, he starred in, oh, gosh, so many movies, An African American, not a young, what? - [Woman] Freeman. – Freeman (Morgan), yes, yes, and he says: “We are at war”. And he does it very well. He's a wonderful actor. But you know, he's tells you, “We are at war”, and we must and dah dah dah dah. And of course, it's very scary.
I hope you have questions, I'm sure that, you know, what I've just said, in the sense of what's happened, it can't be argued about. I mean these are facts, but how you interpret them, that's a whole different issue. So thank you again for, for listening and let's talk. (audience applauding) –
Douglas
Rogers: So I am
acutely aware of which one of us has more experience in this kind of a
forum.
So I think I will skip the part where I ask the first question and open
it up
for questions and comments with the following suggestions and
guidelines. We
have two microphones, please wait for a microphone. You may think that
you have
a loud voice but the people behind you will not agree. So please wait
for the
microphone. Please be aware of the fact that we have some limited time
for
conversation and a lot of us. So please keep your questions
reasonably
brief
and we'll try to keep things moving. And we'll move back and forth from
side to
side. So I'm gonna start on this side. Go ahead, sir.
1st
question: I'm very
interested in your
take on Russian interference. The U.S. Intelligence overwhelmingly
concluded
that Russia is involved in U.S. elections. And I don't think I'm over
assuming
in saying that the Russians are in favor of the Republicans. So I'm
very
interested in your take on that.
Did the Russians interfere? Officially, Putin denies it. The Russians officially deny it. U.S. Intelligence, different intelligence says, it can't furnish the exact proof but it is certain that they did. I've been reading just recently, you know, there was this huge, I don't know how many pages, special issue in New York Times about the you know, pages and pages with wonderful illustrations that are supposed to really prove, you know, like this. No, this kind of thing. This is journalism. Interesting, isn't it? And when you read the article very carefully, and you ask yourself, it's not an article. This one, two, three, four with graphics, five, six, six pages of the New York Times. And when you read it carefully, you ask yourself, why was it published now? It's got to be a reason for this, right? I mean, this happened a while ago. What is the idea? And what you find at the very tail end is that over the past few years in this country, the popularity of Mr. Putin has increased by 11%. And the number of people who believe that the Russians interfered has gone down by five. That's a good reason to publish something like this. And this is a very detailed, interesting story that doesn't furnish any proof. But it's very well done as the New York Times does. This is just one. So I said this came out September 20th. The next one comes out in Time Magazine, which is October 1st, not yet their big story on the same thing, but this is, again, the interference of the Russians. And then we have another story in the New York Times September 26. So I'm saying to myself, wow, this is like a kind of a salvo cannons going. And I have to ask myself, is there a reason for this? And I would ask you, you know, why now? Does this have to do with the midterm elections? I think it probably does. Now, did the Russians interfere? I think they probably did. I think they probably did. Was that effective? I doubt it, I very much doubt it. They didn't spend a whole lot of money, about $100,000, which is really nothing when you talk about the election. But they did, you know, some interesting stuff, if you will.
I believe that, to actually think that Trump won the election because of Russian interference, you have to be very naive for that. I mean, a farmer in Idaho was influenced by Russian propaganda? I mean, I worked in Soviet propaganda for many years. And I'm not of the highest, how should I say this? I mean, it's not that great propaganda. (audience laughing) You know. It's not something I'm proud of what I did. I mean, perhaps what I do today is because of what I did back then, you know, try and make up. But really, was Putin the man who said, let's do this? I don't know, I can't say yes or no to that. I'm a journalist, give me proof. Give me proof and I'll say yes or no, depending on that. But I think yeah, there was probably an attempt to do it and so what? Does America ever interfere in elections, anywhere? (audience laughing) Never! You know, why is it okay for you and not okay for them? You know that's a question. Well, I got an answer to that from one former CIA high ranking gentleman. He said: "Well, you see, yes, we do interfere. But we interfere for good, and you interfere with that." So I thought, well, that's it. So that's how it answer your question. I would say, yes, I would not exaggerate the result of that, the impact of it. And I would say that it's being used as a political toy ploy in this country now for a variety of reasons. And it only really surfaced after Hillary lost. Before that, it wasn't there. But you had to find a reason why she lost. And of course, it was the big bad Russian bear. And that's part of the course, isn't it? Le's hear the next question.
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- [Man] what is your opinion of the past Trump, Putin meeting? And you think it was for show or do you think it's actually reasoning trying to better our relations. - Even if it was for show, it was good. It was good for, how should I put this, for public feeling. At last, these two men, one of whom is the president of the most powerful country in the world, and the other is the president of a country that has 10,000 nuclear warheads, and may not be that powerful, but it's very dangerous. These two men have gotten together. And that in itself is positive. Nothing was really achieved. But I would say that one of the important thing is it seems to me that the two men kind of like each other. And that's very important. You know, Gorbachev and Reagan, were completely different human beings, I mean completely. But they like each other. And they achieve some really incredible breakthroughs when you think about it. So I think it was a good thing. I think it was a first step. Of course here, the reaction to it was very negative. Because supposedly, well, you know what Trump said that he trusted Putin, and that he trusted his intelligence. So how can you trust both? They're saying opposite things. And there was a lot of talk about the fact that he lost to Putin. What did he lose? He gave Putin the opportunity to be on the same stage with him. That's true, that's true. Did that increase Putin's stature? I don't think so, I don't think so at all. And I hope that there's a next meeting, I hope there is. I hope that somehow there will be an attempt to break out of the situation that we're in now. I mean, I'm not again, I'm not a big fan of Mr. Trump's. But even if he tries to do something, the Congress, the U.S. Congress, seems hell bent on not allowing that. And I don't know why. Now, if, if the American establishment wants regime change in Russia, wants Putin out and someone different in, if that is the aim of the people who run this country, let's put it that way, that is extreme dangerous. It's not going to happen. It's not going to happen. Russians are living worse today than they did five years ago. The sanctions are hurting. But the average Russian is saying, we're being punished for things we never did. This is not fair. This is the American bully, throwing his weight around. And we'll take it, we can take it. And I think that's true. The Russians, the tougher it is, the more tough they become. They're pretty weak when things are good. No, it's true, but when things are tough, that's when they're really, you know. And I was reading this book by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. It's called "The Cycles of American History," and he dwells on 1850 when the, you know, there were revolutions in Europe in 1848. And there was a Hungarian Revolution. And the leader of that revolution was a man called Kossuth. And finally, that revolution was, and he was destroyed by the Austrians and the Russians. And so speaking in Congress, an American senator said that the United States should interfere. This is 1850. And Senator Hale, and there's this quote, he said, the future historian might start off his chapter about the year 1850 in the following manner. At the commencement of this year, the American Senate, the highest legislative body of the world, the world wisest, greatest and most magnanimous people that ever lived or ever will live, forgetting and neglecting the trifling local affairs, which considered their own limits, constituted themselves into a high court and proceeded to try the nations of the earth for atrocious acts of despotism. 1850, the idea that the United States has the right to interfere in other countries because they behaved badly from a U.S. or other point of view, that was from a U.S. point of view, 1850, well, then you begin to understand a lot of other things, because that's what the United States has done time and time again, but when another country does that, that's not permissible. So in Syria, if the U.S. goes in to protect the so called and support, the so called moderate opposition. And the Russians go in to support Saddam, not Saddam. - [Audience] Assad. - Assad, the Americans can do it, that's okay. The Russians can't, you know, where's your logic here? It's a tit-for-tat thing, isn't it? So, you know, that's pretty much in my view the answer there. That's how I look at this issue. - Is there someone over on this side? - Are we done? - No, no, pick on this side. There's a question right over here. Perhaps, if you would also identify yourselves before you ask your question. - [Rob] Okay, my name is Rob Foreman, I work for the medical school here. I used to listen to you on radio Moscow so (laughs). - That was a long time ago. - [Rob] See the gray hairs? - Yeah, well-- (audience laughing) - [Rob] But I'd like to frame it a little differently. That I'm not so sure I perceive Americans to be hating what Russia did in interfering, although America has some of that attitude that you described, but disliking the fact that someone who is largely considered to be an incompetent president, who does not have the interests of this country at heart is beholden to the Russians, even if the Russians, what they did was comparable to the what the Americans have done in Central America and who knows where else. And on that basis, I guess my question is A, do you think that analysis is accurate and B, why not? If not, because I don't know that it is so much an attack on what the Russians did in 2016 as on the person who seems to be in the pocket of those who did it? - Well, I would say this, it was Kennedy who used to say, I'll say this to that, right. I will say this. What I said initially, when I compared what Trump was saying during the presidential campaign and what Hillary was saying, it's obvious to anyone that the Russians would support Trump, it's obvious. And Americans should understand that. Not because of what Trump stands for, not because he's a whatever he is, not because he wants the Supreme Court to be more conservative. Russians don't care about that. They don't even, it's not part of what they think. But they think about the relationship between Russia and the United States. And judging from what he said, back then, their relationship could improve. And that's basically it on the one hand. On the other hand, you recall as well as I do, how many American senators, how many political figures said that the Russians were trying to destroy American democracy. What does that mean? How so that the aim of the Russians was to somehow destroy American democracy? There's none of that. So I can understand what you're saying. But it really is not at all. It doesn't correspond to what Mr. Putin or the majority of people in Russia really cared about, or care about today. Today, there is much less support for Donald Trump in Russia than there was. People are asking themselves, who the hell is this man? He comes here and he says one thing and he goes away and says something completely different. You know, if today he says, yes, tomorrow he says no to the same thing. So there are lots of questions. And there's kind of a, how should I put this? They don't take him too seriously anymore, except that he has enormous power. - [Alexander] My name is Alexander, I'm an undergraduate. You touched on at the beginning of your talk about how there's intense American hatred in Russia. And just now you say that, you know, most Russians would want to improve relations. Why do you think, how does that help push into have like, very bad relations with America or like a bad image of Americans and Russian minds? And also, do you think that this hatred is reciprocal, like, is there a distrust of or dislike of Russians in America? - I think the word hatred is a bit strong and I didn't use it. I said that the attitude of Russians today towards American is more negative than it was back during the Cold War, the worst times, and I think it's mutual. And I think that that's the result of what the politicians have said, what they've done and what the media is doing in both countries. And I think it's an issue of political will. Because before Gorbachev came to power in Russia, in Soviet Union, excuse me, the attitude was negative in this country, very negative towards Soviet Union, and the Russians, you know, the Russians, oh, the Russians are coming (mumbles). But as soon as Gorbachev started changing things, glasnost, perestroika, suddenly became Gorby, he became, you know, America's favorite guy. So I think that if there is a desire on both sides to change that attitude, it can be done very quickly. And that's why I say that we're manipulated. We are manipulated. And we all say, well, I'm totally independent. It's not true, we make our decisions, and we come to certain conclusions because of what we read, because of what we see and because of what we hear. So, basically, that's it. I would say that certainly the internet allows us to get a much broader picture. In fact, we could communicate with the other side via the internet. It's not happening very much, but it is a little bit. So that the, how should I put this, the ordinary citizen could do a lot to change what's happening in both countries, and it's a two way street. And I think it's people like you, that is to say of your age, they're the ones who for me, are the reason for optimism because you can do this. Whereas people of my age and slightly younger, can do far less. So I would hope that, you know, what I've said today might lead you to look into this. And I don't say to anyone, believe me. Trust me, heaven forbid, look into it. That's all I would say. - So I was struck in both your talking and now your sort of mutual indictment of the media on both sides and I've been curious for a while about how this may or may not be different to what this picture looks like say in the mid 1980s. - I wonder if you could recall, so just take the New York Times. I mean, I wonder if you could recall with you know, what New York Times reporting about Russia about the Soviet Union was like, in the 80s. - Yeah. - And whether you see a significant difference-- - Let me give you an example. Back in the 1970s, 1980s, all of the major television networks, which are the most powerful in the sense of affecting back then especially affecting people's use. All three of the major networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC had bureaus in Moscow. The head of the ABC Bureau was a woman by the name of Anne Garrels. Well, that was a rare thing in those years for a bureau to have a woman as a chief. Not only that, but she spoke Russian and I'd like to tell you that the vast majority of American journalists did not speak Russian, they had interpreters, she didn't. And one day when, and I met her at some reception, and I was doing the show that, you know, I did for Moscow radio. And we talked and she said, "You should be on U.S. television." I said, well, you know, how does that happen? She called up Ted Koppel, you remember who he was right, Nightline? I hope you've not forgotten. (audience laughing) And she said, you know, Ted, instead of having dissidents on all the time, who represent 0.0 point something of the country of the Soviet Union, she's called on someone who can can express the Soviet viewpoint and who can do it in English. So I got on Nightline, and since I was not your typical Russian as far as the American audience was concerned, who is this? I had great ratings and so I was on again and again and again. And then on NBC and CBS and here and there. Today, that wouldn't happen. I was allowed to argue the Soviet viewpoint on American television. I was allowed to do that. Ted would invite someone from the State Department to rebut me and very often the State Department would say, we're not gonna do this 'cause Constantine is a pain in the what sits and we don't wanna talk to him, that's fine. Today, I would not get that possibility to be on a major network regularly. And that's what's changed. That's what's really changed. And I've come to think that Government censorship official or not official, and so Soviet Union was official. It was an official censor, you have to go with your piece and the center would read it, stamp it, censorship. Today that doesn't exist in Russia. But of course there is censorship when, you know, the boss says no, you can't say that or you can't print that. So, and I'm talking about mainstream media, right? So I call that government censorship. But there's something that I call company censorship. And it's just as effective. And what's happened with American media much of my regret, is that what used to be independent, you know, CNN belonged to Ted Turner and he ran it. CBS was created by William Paley and he ran it. But gradually, many of these very important sources were bought by larger companies. CNN, he sold it NBC, NBC was bought by AOL, ABC by Disney. And so these very important media, whatever organizations became part of huge conglomerates and information was then made very different. The attitude towards what media is supposed to do changed dramatically. I asked to the group of people, I paid for it actually, just try to find in the New York Times over the past three years, 2015, '16, '17, any positive article about Russia, one positive article, didn't find any. Not one, now I say myself, is that isn't censorship, then what is it? I mean, there have to be people who come to Russia and say, gee, they have good ice cream, you know, or they have great theater, and they do. And people are standing in line for theater tickets. And that's a nice thing, right? Give a more or less accurate, but no, it's all negative. And that's the New York Times, let alone everything else. And it's to me, it's terribly disappointing, because I was, you know, I worked here for many CNBC for quite a few years until a man by the name of Roger Ailes, I don't know if you recall who that was, he killed our program because we were too liberal. Just didn't resume the contract, and that was that. So I know what freedom to press is on both sides of the fence as it were. It's a different issue. So that's what I'm saying that we in a strange way corporate censorship is just as effective and sometimes far more sophisticated than government censorship. - I think we're over on this side of the room and people in the middle are also welcome to ask questions somewhere. We see a head way in the back. - Actually, you could lob the microphone. - [Rick] So, my name is Rick Schneider. I work with Rivendell Institute at Yale. - Where are you? - [Rick] Right here. - Okay, thank you. - [Rick] I'm also a visiting professor, have been at GMO and currently at Vushka. - Yeah. - [Rick] So my question is, from your discussions, experience with leaders in Russia, do you sense any room for compromise on Ukraine? I mean, after all the, maybe the big sticking point right now in our relations is all of those sanctions, most of the sanctions other than the Magnitsky, of course, but most of the sanctions are about Ukraine and Donbass is a big problem. So, is there room for compromise to fix that? - I bet, first of all, I applaud the question because the key word is compromise. The key word is compromise. I had asked for the possibility to show a map. Is that still possible or is that not possible anymore? I wanna answer your question, because I wanna show something that I think is important. And I asked, oh my! (audience laughing) I asked that a map of Russia with Ukraine be put up on the screen and hopefully-- - [Technician] This will take, it'll take a couple of seconds. - I'm in no hurry, and a map of the United States and Mexico be put up on screen. Now, let me go back to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. Two totally independent leaders, Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro decide that it would be a good idea for Russia to deploy missiles on Cuban soil. Did they have the right to make that decision? Absolutely, two independent countries, and Fidel Castro was not a satellite, for sure. So, is that, okay. So they make that agreement. And so it's begin bringing in them the missiles or the parts to assemble. And the United States discovers this. - [Technician] That's not the (mumbles). No, no, no. - And Kennedy says to the Russians, turn your ships around, or we will sink them. And if there leads to World War III, so be it. And the Russians turn their ships around. But there was a compromise. Not made public in this country at that time. Kennedy agreed to pull out American missiles that were deployed in Turkey in exchange, because the Russian said, look, you have missiles in Turkey right on our border, almost. You say our missiles are an existential threat, but so are yours. Take them out and we will not deploy ours. That was a compromise. Now, Kennedy asked that this not be made public because it would kind of be seen as a loss of faith and blah, blah, blah, and it wasn't made public and then it was later. So that was a compromise. And it helps avoid World War III. Well, this is not yet happening-- - You may have to sort of ask folks to conjure in their minds. - All right, I will do that. - Yes, I think you wanted to-- - So now the Russian leadership sees NATO as an existential threat. Rightly or wrongly, that's not the point. The point is that that's the way it's seen. And this is not politics. You know, why would you bring NATO closer and closer to our borders, they say. In Latvia, it's on the border, in Estonia, it's on the border. Now, Ukraine is being, is moving westward, the complicated issue, the United States has played a certain role in this, that's not the point. It's moving westward. If it ultimately goes into the western fold or whatever you wanna call it, then it's logical to surmise that Ukraine will join the European Union and will become a NATO member. Now Ukraine has a border with Russia. Not only that, but Crimea, which was traditionally Russian, but I'm not, we can go into the complicated thing about how Ukraine was Russia and was (mumbles), not the point, but Sebastopol was always the base of the Navy, the Russian Navy, naval fleet of the Black Sea. So if Crimea remains Ukraine, and if Ukraine becomes part of NATO, the Russian fleet won't be. So that's the poll, but the American 60 might very well be there. And NATO will be on Russia's southwest border. And the Russians see this as an existential danger. And they say, we will not permit it. Now, does that correspond to international law? No, it doesn't. When you talk about existential threat, you say, I don't care about international law, as in the Cuban Missile Crisis. You say, no, we don't give a damn how you feel. We're not going to allow this. It is my opinion that had from the very outset, been some kind of internationally negotiated agreement, that Ukraine would not become a member of NATO for at least the next 50 years, there would be no Ukrainian problem. Why did I ask for a map of the United States and Mexico? Well, the United States has a pretty large border with Mexico. Now imagine that you have a revolution in Mexico. That's not that hard to imagine. And imagine that the government that comes to power is not a big fan of the United States of America. I think that too, is not difficult to imagine. But since it's a little bit afraid of big brother, it asks the Russians to send over three or four or five divisions to be placed on the U.S. Mexican border. You think the U.S. would accept that? So why would the Russians accept this? That's what it's really all about. Does there have to be a compromise? In my opinion, yes. And the compromise has to be that Ukraine guarantee will not become a member of NATO. And then the compromise is that the Russians get out. We get out, but there's the guarantee. Crimea is a different issue. There could be an agreement that let's do another referendum under international supervision. Let's see what the people of Crimea want. Do they really wanna be part of Russia or do they wanna be part of Ukraine? Or do they wanna be an independent republic? I know that the answer will be overwhelming. And so does everyone. Which is why no one is even suggesting because the majority of the people who live in Crimea wanna be part of Russia. It's a tradition, it's existed that way for a long time. But basically, that's my answer. Yes, you need a compromise. And if neither side is willing to compromise, well, then we're in deep whatever. - We're over here for the next question. (man speaks in foreign language) I can't hear you. (man speaks in foreign language) You guys speak Russian? - [Man] No, I gonna switch to English. I just wanted to greet you in Russian. I've been following you for many years, your work. Going back to tell telebridge was Phil Donahue and certainly, some of us remember those days in Washington back in the Soviet Union. I'm from Ukraine, just for the record. So I certainly share your view about a lot of things that you speak about. Today, however, I'm struggling a little bit to accept your point of view. And I can't get rid of a feeling that it's almost like a legal defense that is trying to explain the bad behavior of a person by the external circumstances. I'm certainly not naive or idealistic about the policymaking in any country, including the United States. And certainly, I do agree that mistakes were made. Not being an expert in this field, it's difficult for me to really know the exact chronological sequence of the events. So it's difficult to argue what was the cause and what was the effect of what you're describing. However, in your presentation today, I think you certainly presented Mr. Putin as a positive peace loving person. And I'm not sure that I agree with that assessment. - I don't know, I don't. - [Man] Well, you certainly brought up a number of effects that presented him as somebody who was continuously on the ongoing basis reaching out to the world, not just the United States, but the West was the peace, mission in mind. However, his actions, not just vis-a-vis, Crimea but overall, Eastern Ukraine. His pretty aggressive actions in Syria, certainly don't create that position. So I think there's a little bit of a disconnect between, either that's the United States or our policymakers made that, created that image of Putin as somebody who is a not an easy person to work with? (audience applauding) But certainly his actions in many ways, not just his actions, but also the aggressive tactics of the military, Russian military, in a lot of his regions don't support that, that view. But to get to my question, I think, while I generally if we, for discussion sake, agreed to accept that the U.S. and maybe the Western world contributed in a way to the image of Putin that you described. Putin is not only responsible for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, but also for its domestic policy, and who contributed to his image as the domestic leader of Russia as somebody who is fairly authoritarian in the way he runs the country, thank you. - That wasn't a question but I'll answer it. (audience laughing) I made a point of up to 2007. And up to 2007, Putin did nothing internationally that would speak of an aggression, nothing at all. It all happened after 2007. It happened in 2008 with Georgia, with the war. Officially it wasn't Putin, it was Vladimir, but you know, so no big difference. And then all the other things that you're talking about, but up until 2007. And so that Munich speech when he said, enough is enough, you have to respect us, you have to take into consideration, our interest, the world is not uni polar, it is multipolar and we will have to keep that in mind. Incidentally, that's why he's so popular in Russia. Not because he contributed to people's living much better although they did, but he was lucky because the price of oil was high and so that certainly helped. But because people saw him as someone who stood up to the American bully, and told him off. And that's where his popularity comes from. Russia is back. We're up from our knees, as people would say. And they have to take us into consideration. And we don't give a damn if you like us or you don't like us. But you know, Putin is our man. He is a true patriot. And that's where his strength lies. Now, if you talk about his domestic policies, I would absolutely agree with you that A, he is authoritarian, B, he has pretty much stymied the development of democracy in Russia. I do not agree with basically almost all of his policies in Russia, not all but almost all. I'm much more supportive of his international views than with his domestic views. So I have no argument with you. I did not present, I don't think I did present him as a, you know, a lover of peace. I was simply making the point that up until a certain moment you could not really blame him for anything. And that well, I say find it, just point me, you know, say, well in 2006 or in 2005, Russia did this and this, you know, I would say okay, fine. I don't know what, you know, what are we talking about. And of course, Ukraine, with its proximity to Russia, and have having been seen, always as close to Russia because of the language, because of the religion, in a way the Russians, you know, the Rus being where Russia was born in Ukraine. So the fact that Ukraine would leave, very painful to Russians, as it would be in, you know, in other countries, but that certainly does not, how should I this, that certainly does not make Putin blame us in what's happened in Ukraine. So I have no argument with you at all. But because of the mistakes that we're making, in my opinion that were made, you have now a man who has a very different outlook than he did. How many years ago now, you know, and that's too bad. I think that there was a huge window of opportunity. And it was missed. And it's too bad for everyone. - There's a hand right up here. - [Anastasia] Hi, my name is Anastasia, I'm from Moscow. So I grew up in Russia, but I've lived in the U.S. now for five years. So we've talked a lot about Putin and how powerful he is and his international policy. But, you know, being the Russian myself, I asked myself, is there a future for Russia? Should we hope for anything better? Should we because you know, now, I feel like there is a big division in terms of what people think like some people just think Putin is everything, all we've got, and there is no other future for us. But then, of course, with Navalny being in the picture, and I know you're not the fan of him. - No, I'm not. - [Anastasia] But, you know, except for him, of course, there might be someone else. But my question is, should we hope for any improvements in terms of like for us for Russians? Should we hope for the future for Russia or should we just practice our American accent and forget about? - Well, you know, when you asked that question, I would have to ask what what do you mean? What would you like to change? What is it that that makes you ask that question? And my answer to that is, of course, there's a future. And the future is, let me back up a little bit here. The main problem, from my point of view in Russia, is that the leadership, all the leadership is Soviet. All the people who are at the head of politics and all the rest of it, they're all Soviet. They were born in the Soviet Union. They went to Soviet schools. They were members of the Young Pioneers. They were members of the Young Communist League. They were members of the Communist Party, most of them. They were created, formed by a system that no longer exists. They're trying to run a system that they really don't know anything about. And they're not very good at it. But whatever they do, is based on the mentality that they have. And that mentality is a Soviet mentality. And there's not much you can do about that. That's the way they were brought up. And you can't say, well, where are the others 'cause there are no others. And what I say is, in my opinion, the hope is that people who are not born in the Soviet Union, who were born afterwards, that is to say, the next generation and the generation after that, that's when you will see real change and you have to have patience. I have no doubt that Russia is a great country. And you know, during the worst times like the Tsar Nicholas I, during those years, Russia's greatest literature developed. So it's not that, it's not that you can't just look at it from that side, I certainly hope, I won't see it. Not at my age, it's gonna take another 20, 30 years. But in all countries, for democracy to develop, it took over 200. And I guess there were people back then saying, gee, do we have a future? Because there were all kinds of things. You had slavery in the United States less than 200 years ago. Come on, since you have to look at it realistically. So my answer to you is yes, I absolutely do believe it. But it's going to take time and you cannot do anything about that. Except that if you're young, you can look forward to a change that is inevitable because those people will disappear. And it will be your ballgame. As a Yankee fan, I know what I'm saying. (audience laughing) - [Alec] I'm here, here, over there. - Oh, okay. - I'm a father of Yale undergrad. My name is Alec, we met 16 years ago in Kazakhstan. We spent a couple of days in much media business. Remember that? But the question that I have, and you know, we had very interesting discussion 16 years ago about what made my family move to America from Odessa. And, you know, and I actually I saw a lot about it, and now I know my answer. But back then, I believe I told you the story about my father who really, you know, after the conflict and Transnistria that was 100 kilometers from Odessa, when people all of a sudden started killing each other. You know, geopolitics, yeah, we all understand that. Tit for tat, we understand that. You know, the United States and Mexico, Russia and Ukraine, Southern border, NATO fleet and Sevastopol, we all understand that. But with people going and killing each other right now in 10 years, people who lived on same street, it's not even Karabakh, it's not like even Armenians and Azerbaijanis, we have some ethnic conflicts, right? They have some, you know, religious differences. But whatever is going on in Donbass right now when neighbors killing neighbors over nothing, I mean, do you really think that that whole issue of Ukrainian language is like really pressing there. Or these stories that were made up about, you know, Western Ukrainians, Banderas, you know, Nazis was gonna move in, who's gonna, you know, how do we stop that? How do we stop people from killing each other in situations like that, because, you know, they can meet up in Minsk, they can do whatever, you know, they can make agreements. They can disagree, you know, better than me about, you know, money interest and cryptocracy that is so omnipresent in Russia and Ukraine, and everywhere. But how do we stop that? How do we stop? How can United States and Germany and Russia get together and stop brothers from killing brothers? - Well, you know, if I had the answers to all of those things, I probably would be in a different job. No, seriously, I mean, I can't tell you how to solve the world's problems. And, you know, people are killing each other. In many places in Africa, for instance, brother's killing brother and so on. And this is going on everywhere. But I would say that if the leaders of Russia, of Ukraine, of the United States, of Germany, we're actually asking that question. That question they were asking. I think they'd find a way to answer it. But I don't think they're asking that question. I think they're asking very different questions. And they have very different aims. And that's why this is going on. So, to me, the answer is pretty obvious. How you make people do that, that's a different question. Why is it that egoistic due to political interests take first place over these things. That's the real question. And when you say we understand, I don't know who you're talking about. Most people don't even know, you know, in this country, where Georgia is for instance, except the state of Georgia. Most people are really really and in Russia too, the level of knowledge is lower than the doorstep as they say. So there is no effort and the media does not play that game at all. It doesn't say, how do we stop? It says they are to blame. And that's it, and on both sides. So I think the only way to stop it is for us to talk, make our voices heard. And that's not easy. And sometimes it's dangerous. But again, if you know, did I ever, no, of course not. There was a guy by the name, his last name was Rindskopf, he is a German who fought during World War I, he was the youngest Japanese, U-boat commander or U-boat, as they were called, submarines. And when Germany lost the war, he was totally crushed by it. And he became a priest, Protestant priest in Hamburg and very anti war. And as he went up the ladder as it were, Hitler did too. And Hitler became the head of Germany and he became the head of the Protestant church in Hamburg at the same time. And he spoke out against war. And finally he was arrested, and he was sent to a concentration camp. But he survived. And when he came back, he wrote a book. And in that book, there's a passage that I know by heart, because I think it's one of the most important and powerful things I've ever heard. He wrote, "When they came for the Jews, "I didn't say anything, because I'm not Jewish. "And when they came for the communists, "I didn't say anything, because I'm not a communist. "And when they came to the trade union members, "I didn't say anything, because I'm not a member "of the trade union. "And when I came for the Catholics, "I didn't say anything because I'm not a Catholic. "And when they came for me, there was no one to speak." And I feel that, I very much feel that way. If we don't speak out, however we can, and not irresponsibly, and not to say oh, look look at me, but rather with this understanding that it's our human duty to do this, well, then we keep saying, well, they should do it. That's, it's certainly very Russian. They should do it. And if they don't, then what? So that's really, that's my view. And it's an idealistic view, perhaps, but that's the way I look at it. - [Anastasia] Okay, hi, I'm here. So my name is-- - (mumbles) to the left. - Here. Coincidentally, I'm also Anastasia from Moscow. (audience laughing) Hats of us here, I'm a PhD student at Yale. So you started your talk by outlining to strategists, the U.S. could have taken towards the Soviet Union-- - Towards Russia. - Towards Russia, after the Soviet Union collapsed, and presented this as a cornerstone of the situation we have right now. - Yeah. - So if we hypothesize with your knowledge of Russian politics, economy, you know, the Soviet mentality that you mentioned, do you believe that some version of Marshall Plan could have ever changed anything? - Well, you know, that's a question that regardless of how I answer, I can't prove it 'cause it didn't happen. So it's kind of as you say, it's very hypothetical. But do I think that that would have been better than what they did? Yes, clearly, clearly, it would have been better. To what extent it would have failed, who knows? I don't know. But I do know that when Gorbachev announced glossiness, the media in Russia changed dramatically. And I think nobody would argue with that. Dramatically overnight, it became a different kind of media. During the Soviet times, 40 million people tuned into the Voice of America in Russia, The BBC World Service in Russian, the Deutsche Welle in Russian, because they were not getting in their own media information that they were getting on these wave, you know, and the Russians tried to block that. The Soviet government did, spent trillions of rubles, trying to block them but people listened nonetheless. As soon as glossiness came, and they stopped listening, they were getting it from their own source. They were getting the information, people know exactly when they're getting any when they're not. Or usually they do. So that's one example of how quickly things change. So I do think that had there been this attitude, let's help them. Let's help them become democratic. I do think that it would have been a positive, the result would have been positive. I can't tell you how positive. So that's, you know, my hypothetical answer to your hypothetical question. - I think we have two more, time for two more questions, perhaps, over here. - [Acia] Thank you, my name is Acia. I'm from Yerevan, Armenia right there on the map. - Well-- - [Acia] Yeah, it is tiny, but it's still there. - You see it over there, right. That tiny little country that says Armenia? - [Acia] Yes. - Okay. - [Acia] So I'm a doctoral student and I study genocides, but today I'm going to ask-- - You study what? - [Acia] Genocides. - Wow! - [Acia] yeah, a lot of fun. But today, I'm going to ask a question about current developments that happened right next door to Russia, and are very connected to what you talked, about speaking out the new generation that can change, the generation that maybe does not have this mentality can change or may be the change. - Yeah. - And something like that recently happened in Armenia, no one ever expected that peaceful demonstrations in such a tiny post Soviet landlocked country could lead to change, which was the collapse of the old rule and establishment of the government, which is totally and fully supported by the people. - Yeah. - And the funny question that I always hear when I discuss this with students or at conferences, is how come Russia did not intervene into these developments in any way? And I would really appreciate your opinion in this, like, how come that Vladimir Putin did not really respond in any visual way to this development? And how was this even or was it observed, seen in Russia because it was next door. It was a big change. And some people were even speculating how this could serve as an example for other countries to topple their governments, et cetera, thank you. - Well, one reason might be that Putin isn't quite the man you all think he is. You know, that's a possibility, I'm not insisting on it. Another reason might be that the new leader of Armenia, never expressed any anti Russian sentiment. On the contrary, said we are in an independent country, but look where we are. And we've always had very close ties with Russia and we wanna have close ties, economic ties. There was no absolutely no sense of enmity on the contrary, And it was the people, there was no doubt at this time, that was the people who spoke out. You know, Armenia is really a very small country. What's the population now? Three million, and there was a million people that came out. Can you imagine 30% of the entire population comes out in the streets. You can't ignore that. And that's another reason. But the very question, why didn't Putin interfere reflects the way people think about it. Because that's the way it's been depicted. So, you know, that's my answer, incidentally. Well no, I'm not gonna go into that. One more question you say. - I think one more, yeah, we'll try to wrap up by six. So we're back on this side. I see a hand right next to you. Hello, you. - [Woman] Hi, I'm a master's student in European and Russian studies. I guess my question is about the poisoning in the UK earlier this year. (audience laughing) - Finally, finally. - [Woman] Is there a way for us to respond to that strongly that doesn't escalate, the kind of confrontational paradigm? - Yeah, you know, when this took place, so I was very, I was shocked and I tried to figure out for myself some kind of logic. Now, you know why we would do this and why. Now, you know, let's forget about the child, I means she's lame, you know, she didn't do anything. Skripal, he was a military agent, right? He worked for the former GRU, not to the KGB, Putin work to the KGB, he works for the GRU, which is military intelligence, and they can't stand the KGB, and the KGB can't stand their intelligence. That's normal competition. So, and he betrayed his country. Let's face it, right. He went over to the other side and began to work for British intelligence. And he was caught, and he was tried. And he was sentenced to 13 years. Now, I don't know if you're familiar with what happens to spies, who to turn against their own country, and are then caught? Well, in wartime, they're shot. But in peacetime, well, it's usually something like 30 years, 25, 13 is a weird sentence. Not only does he get this rather short sentence, considering, but he's exchanged for Soviet, excuse me, Russian spies who were caught. Now if he was exchanged that means that he really didn't know anything at that point. He was no danger to the Russian side. So, you know, let him go and we'll get ours back. Now, Putin doesn't like traders, who does? If Putin wanted to kill him, he was in prison, he would do it. And you could say that he had a heart attack or that he committed suicide or whatever. He was no problem killing when he was in jail in Russia. They let him go, they exchanged him, they could have exchanged someone else, they exchanged him. What sense would it make to poison this man under those circumstances, I mean logically. Putin is anything but stupid. Not stupid, it's very risky. The risk of somehow this being found out is always there. Why do it, this is not a dangerous person. He can't do anything. He can talk about what he knows, but it's over. So I try to find, I'm not saying he didn't do it. I'm saying I'm trying to find some kind of logic, logic, not emotions, logic as to why Putin would be involved in something like that. Alright, it's not Putin. It's one of those lower, you know, one of the GRU people who think that Putin would like it if they did it But would Putin like it if it was discovered? No, of course not, they get their head chopped down. So why would they risk it? They're not gonna get decorations for doing it. Because if Putin had ordered it, then yes. So why would they do it? So to me, it really remains a mystery. Because it's stupid, it's counterproductive. It doesn't do anything positive at all. So am I denying anything? I'm not denying, I'm saying give me proof. Please, just show me, yes, there it is. Now this interview, did you see it? The interview of Rita, what's her name? Sonya, of those two two people. Did you see it? It was one of the most unprofessional pieces of work that I've ever seen. (audience laughing) That was just, you know, I thought what, who, why? And it happened, you know, the day before that Putin had said these two men should go to the media and so they come the next day, they're there, you know. It's laughable except that it's not, not really. So I would say to you that whole story is disgusting. I find it hard to believe that Putin initiated it, I really do, but somebody did. There's no doubt about it. And now I've heard a really nice story. You know that Mr Skripal in Britain, every time he'd meet with his handlers, as they call them, he would be paid a certain amount, not a lot, you know, 5,000 pounds or 7,000 pounds, where if he felt he had something really interesting to say, 10,000 pounds. But again, he was of no real interest. So I'm thinking, and now this is John le Carré, right? I'm thinking, British intelligence gets together and says, we don't need this guy, and he's costing us money. And he's not kidding. Now, why don't we, and make it look like it's Putin. Well, that's brilliant Chap, you should do this, you know. So British intelligence poisons the guy, and the whole thing works this way. It's not impossible. I kind of laughed at myself when I came up with that one. And I'd like to talk to Mr. le Carré and see how he thinks. Incidentally, if you've not read his last two books, "The Pigeon Tunnel," which is a story of his life as a spy. And the other one I forgot, "Legacy of a Spy." He writes with total disgust about that profession that he was in for so long. I mean, really. So, you know, there it is. My answer to you is, I just don't know. It's such a weird thing, he really is. I see no reason for it. It's just invading another country I can explain, right. But this I don't know. It makes no sense. One day, we'll know the real thing. Always have, is always very, I don't know, if you've ever been there. I was there, I shot a documentary about England. And so, you know why I went there, not because the steeple is I don't know, how many feet high or something. I have no idea. It's a beautiful, beautiful church actually. But it's because they have their one of the three original copies of the Magna Carta. And that's the beginning of real democracy in the West, if you don't count the ancient Greeks, and I really wanted to see it. And they brought it out. And I can't tell you what, you know, when you look at that. And you say, what was it 12, 15 and they were already saying you can't put a man in prison without proving that he's committed a crime. And you have all the kings and queens and all of that. It's amazing, that's why I went there. These guys didn't even know it was there, right? They went to see the steeple, I mean, come on. - All right-- - Let me thank everyone for listening to me.
[1] Chief of Staff and United States Secretary of
the Treasury under President Ronald Reagan, and as U.S. Secretary of
State and
White House Chief of Staff under President George H. W. Bush.